July 1914.com - References
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May 2020, being reorganized, updated


(1) Niccolo Machiavelli: The Prince, Chapter XIV: That Which Concerns A Prince On The Subject Of The Art Of War.

(2) "...for the 28 years that he served as chancellor of Germany, Bismarck preserved what he had built by a restrained and wise diplomacy, which was the single most important element in maintaining the peace of Europe..."[italics added]
Henry A. Kissinger: Otto von Bismarck, Master Statesman: New York Times, March 31, 2011.

“...the greatest diplomatic and political achievement [unified Germany and reorganized Europe] by any leader in the last two centuries.”
Professor Jonathan Steinberg: Ibid.

"No other statesman of his standing had ever before shown the same great moderation and sound political sense of the possible and desirable.... Bismarck at least deserves full credit for having steered European politics through this dangerous transitional period without serious conflict between the great powers."{italics added]
William L. Langer [former Chairman, History Department, Harvard University. Former head of the Research and Analysis Branch of the Office of Strategic Services, later installed the office of National Estimates in the Central Intelligence Agency] European Alliances and Alignments 1871–1890 (1931) at 503–04.

"... the greatest political achievement of modern times."[italics added]
Professor Jonathan Steinberg: Bismarck: A Life - November 29, 2012, at 11:28

"The scale of Bismarck's triumph cannot be exaggerated. He alone had brought about a complete transformation of the European international order. He had told those who would listen what he intended to do, how he intended to do it, and he did it.

"He achieved this incredible feat without commanding an army, and without the ability to give an order to the humblest common soldier, without control of a large party, without public support, indeed, in the face of almost universal hostility, without a majority in parliament, without control of his cabinet, and without a loyal following in the bureaucracy. He no longer had the support of the powerful conservative interest groups who had helped him achieve power. The most senior diplomats in the foreign service... were sworn enemies and he knew it."[italics added]
Jonathan Steinberg (2011) Bismarck: A Life, at 257.

(3) Foreign Secretary Edward Grey: Twenty-Five Years: 1892-1916 (1925) Vol. II, at 30.

(4) The Balkan Crises: International Relations in the Balkans and the Ottoman Empire, 1903- 1914: Rising instability in the Balkans, 1903-1911.
The Balkan Wars and their aftermath, 1912-June 1914.
The Moroccan Crises: International Relations Involving Morocco:
Two times in the decade before WWI, disputes over Morocco ignited extremely dangerous European crises.

(5) Foreign Secretary Edward Grey: Twenty-Five Years (1925) Vol. I, at 305.

(5a) Karl von Clausewitz: On War, CH IX. THE SURPRISE).

(6) Estimates of WWI dead, injured or missing taken from "Source List and Detailed Death Tolls for the Primary Megadeaths of the Twentieth Century"

(7) John Schindler [Professor of National Security Affairs, U.S. Naval War College, formerly NSA]: New Thinking on the Origins of World War I: Foreign Policy Research Institute, May 5, 2014.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hMKqPgWJYr8 At 59:14.

(8) Foreign Secretary Edward Grey: Twenty-Five Years: (1925) Vol. I, at 258, 267.

(9) Changing the Face of War.

(10) Grey, Twenty-Five Years (1925) Vol II, at 11.

(11) Niccolo Machiavelli: The Prince Ch III: Concerning Mixed Principalities.

(12) Grey, Twenty-Five Years (1925) Vol I, at 11, 12.

(13) In a very real way, the electric-telegram-driven June 28-July 1914 Crisis was a precursor to the central problem of the post-1945 US-USSR Cold War. It's worth pointing out that during the Cold War between the US-USSR, the least unlikely path to atomic war was by accident or inadvertence.

The arrival-time of ballistic-missiles (25-30 minutes) was almost equal to the other side's warning-and assessment timeline.

Due to such extreme compression of the warning-time, the Strategic Air Command, NORAD and US Department of Defense grew increasingly concerned about the ever-present possibility that, during any intense international political crisis, incoming false radar data could very quickly (≈ 5-25 minutes) generate a series of escalating reciprocal US-USSR military maneuvers/alerts leading to a full-scale atomic exchange that - similarily to WWI - clearly nobody had fully intended.

July 1914 exploding into WWI bears another similarity to the Cold War in that geographically the countries involved were actually in a far worse position than the US-USSR - no oceans separating them, the Great Powers were literally sitting right next to each other, practically in each others' laps. And they all used electric telegraph cables, which could instantly amplify the tiniest misunderstanding theroughout the entire 5 Power communication system.

(14) Grey (1925) Vol I, at 253, 254.

(15) Grey (1925) Vol I, at 109.

(16) Winston Churchill (1923) The World Crisis, at 199.

(17) Telegraph-Driven Crisis

(18) British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914

(19) Karl von Clausewitz: On War, CH IX. THE SURPRISE).

(20) History.com: First around-the-world telegram sent, 66 years before Voyager II launch, November 24, 2009.

(21) BH Posta: Historical Development.

(22) Sun Tzu: The Art of War, XI. The Nine Situations, at 19; VI. Weak Points and Strong, at 9).

(23) Prince Lichnowsky [German Ambassador to Britain, stationed in London] My Mission to London, 1912-14 (1918) at 11.

(24) Norman B. Leventhal Map Center Collection: Carte générale des grandes communications télégraphiques du monde.

(25) Edward Grey, GREAT POWERS AND BALKANS, House of Commons Debates, 07 October 1912, at 24, 25.

(26) German Telegraph

(27) Mr. Noel Buxton, War in Balkans: Statement by Sir Edward Grey. House of Commons Debates, Aug. 12, 1913, at 2301.

(28) Karl von Clausewitz, On War, CH III.

(29) Karl von Clausewitz, On War, Ch IX. THE SURPRISE).

(30) Sun Tsu, The Art of War. Laying Plans, at 18.

(31) Twenty-Five Years (1925) Vol. I, at 267.

  • Page 2 Refs:

(50) Mr. Bonar Law, Leader of the Opposition, Aug. 12, 1913. [Chancellor of the Exchequer 1916 - 1919, Prime Minister, 1922-1923] WAR IN BALKANS: House of Commons Debates, at 2999.

(51) French President Emmanuel Macron's speech at Armistice centenary event in Paris euronews (in English), Nov 11, 2018, at 3:46.

(52) See (4)

(53) Historical maps of ethnic groups in the Balkans.

(54) Oct. 6, 1908, Austria annexes Bosnia: THE BOSNIAN CRISIS to Apr.1909.

(55) Winston Churchill: The World Crisis (1923) at 30, 31.

(56) Grey (1925) Vol. I, at 322.

(57) Prince Lichnowsky: My Mission to London, 1912-14, at 11.

(58) David Mason, WAR IN BALKANS: House of Commons Debates, July 14, 1913, at 1027, 1028, 1029.

(59) Edward Grey, WAR IN BALKANS: House of Commons, July 14, 1913, at 1029, 1032.

(60) The Balkan Wars and their Aftermath, 1912-June 1914: February 2, 1914.

(61) Prince Lichnowsky : My Mission to London 1912-1914, at 10.

(62) Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey: Twenty-Five Years (1925) at 256.

(63) NASA: The F-1 Engine Powered Apollo Into History, Blazes Path for Space Launch System Advanced Propulsion:
"Five F-1 engines were used in the 138-foot-tall S-IC, or first stage, of each Saturn V, which depended on the five-engine cluster for the 7.5 million pounds of thrust needed to lift it from the launch pad. Each mighty engine stands 19 feet tall by 12 feet wide and weigh over 18,000 pounds. The F-1 was developed by engineers at NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Ala., and its industry team...

"The cluster of five F-1 engines burned a mixture of liquid oxygen and kerosene fuel at more than 15 metric tons per second during its two-and-one-half-minutes of operation. Each F-1 engine had more thrust than three space shuttle main engines combined to lift the vehicle to a height of about 36 miles and to a speed of about 6,000 mph."

"The mighty F-1 remains the most powerful American liquid-fuel rocket engine ever developed. The F-1 still holds the record as the largest single-chamber, single-nozzle liquid fuel engine ever flown."[italics added]

(64) Grey (1925) Vol I, at xxi.

(65) Wired: Freeman Dyson's Brain

(66) Grey (1925) Vol II, at 258, 267.

(67) Grey (1925) Vol I, at 305.

(68) Grey (1925) Vol I, at 304).

(69) Explaining the Outbreak of the First World War - Closing Conference Genève Histoire et Cité 2015, at 28:29-28:57. The Graduate Institute Geneva, Streamed live on May 16, 2015, Margaret MacMillan, Professor of International History, St Antony’s College, University of Oxford.
[This is not to single out the professor. Many other historians probably share that view.
If anything, the professor should be admired for having the courage to say what other historians almost surely think but refuse to admit. Moreover, aside from the statements noted here, a great many of the professor's other remarks on WWI seem incontestably accurate. If anything, the professor should be seriously appreciated & admired for having the rare fortitude to work for many years on the causes of the single worst catastrophe to strike Western Civilization.]

(70) Virtually the only exception was neutral and fiercely independent Switzerland, Europe/Britain's moral center, who from 1914-1945 & throughout the Cold War refused to take part in Europe/Russia/Britain's World Wars, instead taking to colossal heights an astonishingly meticulous strategy of armed defense.

(71) Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds, Ch II.

(72) The hard-boiled Founder of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew, inheriting fierce multi-racial rivalries with radically different languages, having been educated in England, possibly saw multi-language Europe/Britain's horrific 1,000-year history of fighting & wars to "settle" disputes as a very useful role model for what not to do, and pragmatically made all the multi-racial groups comprising Singapore learn English as the working language. (World's safest & most peaceful country as of 2018: Singapore).

(73) Norman Angell.

  • Page 3 Refs:

(80) WAR IN BALKANS: House of Commons Debates, Aug. 12, 1913, at 2297.

(81) Lessons From the Catastrophe, Sep't 11, 1914, at 1:16:32.

(82) Sir Arthur Nicolson [1910-1916 British Permanent Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs] British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, Document Number 19, June 30, 1914.

(83) Harold Nicholson: First Lord Carnock - A Study In The Old Diplomacy, 1930, at 415.

(84) Britannica: Bosnian Crisis of 1908.

(85) International Congresses and Conferences of the Last Century, at 815-816.

(86) "Caught Looking": Sports Lingo: Definition & Meaning" What Is The Definition Of Caught Looking In Baseball?
See also: Baseball Almanac.com: Baseball Rules: 9.00 The Umpire.9.02: "9.02 (a) Any umpire's decision which involves judgment, such as, but not limited to, whether a batted ball is fair or foul, whether a pitch is a strike or a ball, or whether a runner is safe or out, is final."

(87) Lloyd George, Chancellor of the Exchequer: War Memoirs (at 32-33)

(88) Sean McMeekin: July 1914: Countdown to War: 2013, at 59.

(89) QUEEN VICTORIA, By Lytton Strachey (1921)

  • Page 4 Refs:

(100) Sir Edward Grey: Twenty-Five Years (1925) (at 230.)

(101) Thomas Otte, Professor of Diplomatic History at East Anglia, at 1:08:

"...the nature of decisionmaking in 1914. Beyond all of these questions of individual capabilities and capacities, one need to look at a broad issue of governance. And governance in most countries in Europe is extremely poor. Because we are looking at old, largely exhausted elites that recruit themselves from a very small gene-pool.

"The exception in all this I think is Britain. What is different about Britain is that Britain has system of responsible governance. Responsible to parliment. So there needs to be a rational account that needs to be given to parliment. This is not what governments in Berlin, or in Vienna or in St. Petersburg have to do."

Otte is certainly right in general about Britain. Unfortunately, starting June 28th and running through July 1914 he is completely off-base in the timing/specifics. From June 28th through July 1914 there was nothing remotely resembling a "rational account" or "responsible governance." It was almost as if the entire British Gov't, aka, Whitehall, had gone AWOL and ceded virtually the whole of (European) foreign policy to Foreign Secretary Edward Grey.
One man.

Hansard: Parliment Sittings in 1914: The daily record of the House of Lords and the House of Commons for June-July 1914 are ready and waiting for Mr. Otte to study at his convience.

It is dreadfully evident that from June 28, 1914 through most of July 1914 there was ZERO responsibility to Parliment. The House of Lords was on the 2-month long vacation. The House of Commons was told virtually nothing about the Austrian-Serbian Crisis until it was far too late to slow it down. British Prime Minister Asquith, aka, "Squiff", for his love of the bottle, had delegated virtually all responsibility for Foreign Affairs to Sir Edward Grey.

As late as July 28th the British Prime Minister HH Asquith - although exactly what it is he's prime ministering remains unclear - finally weighs in. He also seems strikingly unable to come to grips with a very dangerous sequence of events taking place across the channel vis-a-vis Austria-Hungary, Serbia, Germany and Russia.

Here was a typical exchange in Parliment:

"Mr. Bonar Law: I wish to ask the Prime Minister if he has any information he can communicate on the European situation.

The Prime Minister [HH Asquith]: There are no new developments sufficiently definite to enable any further statements to be made, but we can hope that no unfavorable inference will be drawn from this. I cannot say more.

Lord Hugh Cecil: Can the right hon. Gentleman say if hostilities have broken out?

The Prime Minister: We have no definite information about that."[italics added]
Hansard. Parlimentary Sittings: Austria and Servia 28 July 1914 http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1914/jul/28/austria-and-servia

"[B]ut we can hope..." Official British foreign policy starting 16:00, June 28th and continuing non-stop through almost all July 1914.

That said, it should go without saying that assessing whether British Empire could have promptly stopped July 1914's political meltdown should be taken as much as a tribute to its monarchical parlimentary government's unmatched nearly 1,000-year-long civil history as any necessarily cold, clinical - surgical - exhumation of its exact daily actions or inactions from June 28th through most of July 1914.

It is also true that whatever else can be said about the British Maritime Empire's major flaws, and indeed much could be said, nevertheless this webite's position is in the life of all 1,000-year-old successful empires, there will be some very big mistakes made. And a month is the blink of an eye.

(102) Sir Edward Grey (1925) at 296-97.

(103) Sir Edward Grey (1925) at 32.

(104) Famous Quotations on Monarchy: ALMANACH DE SAXE GOTHA. Official Website of the Almanach de Saxe Gotha Online Royal Genealogical Reference Handbook.

(105) Ibid.

(106) George F. Kennan (U.S. Ambassador to Russia and Yugoslavia, and professor emeritus at the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton): The Decline of Bismarck's European Order: Franco-Russian Relations 1875-1890.

(107) Vernon Bogdanor, Britain and 1914, May 27, 2014

(108) Niall Ferguson: The Pity of War, 1999 at 143, 462.

(109) Sean McMeekin [author, July 1914: Countdown to War] (interview)
http://www.pieria.co.uk/ articles/interview_with_sean_mcmeekin

(110) Fritz Stern (quoted in) Still in the grip of the Great War: Economist, March 27, 2014.

(111) Fritz Stern Acceptance Speech, 2005.

(112) George Steiner: In Buebeards Castle (1971) at 56, 79.

(113) German Maxim MG08 (Maschinengewehr 08) Machine Gun.

(114) German machine-gunner at the Somme

(115) Apocalypse then: Day one of the Somme, 140 to go.

(116) George Coppard: With A Machine Gun to Cambrai (1969) (quoted in) First World War: Battle of the Somme.

(117) Apocalypse then: Day one of the Somme, 140 to go.

(118) 10 Things You May Not Know About the Battle of the Somme

(119) Sir Douglas Haig Sir Douglas Haig's despatches (December 1915-April 1919) (1919) at 5.

(120) General Rees, British Commander, 94th Infantry Brigade at the Somme, July 1, 1916. (quoted in) First World War: Battle of the Somme.

(121) Winston Churchill, The World Crisis, 1916–1918, at 348.

(122) John Schindler [Professor of National Security Affairs, U.S. Naval War College, formerly NSA]
May 5, 2014, New Thinking on the Origins of World War I, Foreign Policy Research Institute
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hMKqPgWJYr8 [At 1:37:23]

_____________________________________________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________________________________________




(2b) Sean McMeekin [Author, July 1914: Countdown to War]: Interview with Sean McMeekin, March 20, 2014.

(2c) Dr. John Deak, Associate Professor, Notre Dame at 33:03.

(2d) Sean McMeekin, July 1914:Countdown to War, 2014, at 30-31.

(3) QUEEN VICTORIA, By Lytton Strachey, 1921, Chapter IX.

(14) This also explains how, once WWI started, and everybody could see that it was going to be a multiple year-long battle instead of the advertised "home by xmas," there was nobody in power in Europe/Britain who could put a stop to it. The principal officials, out of fear of any responsibility for igniting it, had crushed their roles in the affair and once it started seemed quite powerless to stop it.

(15) McMeekin, Sean: July 1914 Countdown to War: 2014, at 390.

(16) Christopher Clark, Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914, Gresham College October 2, 2014

(17) Sean McMeekin [Author, July 1914: Countdown to War] Interview
http://www.pieria.co.uk/ articles/interview_with_sean_mcmeekin

(18) Even in periods of relative world-wide peace such air-raid alerts at NORAD have caused short-lived but very serious problems. In the 1960's NORAD radar indicated a massive Soviet ballistic-missile attack. Senator Charles H. Percy (R. IL) happened to be touring the deep underground Cheyenne Mountain facility, along with Thomas J. Watson, CEO of IBM, and the Galvin of Motorola.

Senator Percy testified all three men were swiftly ushered into a separate room, where they all sweated for over 20 minutes. Senator Percy, who must have been glad to wake up the next day alive, later testified in U.S. Department of Defense Armed Service Committee Hearings that NORAD officers "were absolutely convinced there were missiles coming at us."

The cause of the alert was that computer programmers forgot to include the orbit of the largest nearby non-terrestrial body, the Moon. When the Moon appeared on the horizon that night it showed up on the big display screens inside NORAD as a full-scale Soviet ballistic-missile attack. Another significant false Soviet air raid alert in the later 1970's was caused when a NORAD technician unintentionally put a war training tape into NORAD's real-time computer system.

Yet another false Soviet air-raid alert was caused by a broken "multiplexer." U.S. Senators Barry Goldwater and Senator Gary Hart started a Congressional investigation. DOD's then-point-man Donald C. Latham later testified to Congress the item had cost less than 75 cents. For the most part, NORAD used massive redundant radar systems during these alerts to determine there were no ballistic-missile attacks in progress. Needless to say, the problem of quickly resolving false alarms at NORAD goes into extremis in periods where there is not worldwide peace. Deep discussion of this problem in the open literature is virtually non-existant.

During any Soviet/Russian air-raid there would be only "several minutes" for officials at NORAD using SOSUS radar to detect, for example, submarine-launched ballistic-missiles, which would be quickly discussed in a "missile display conference." The Strategic Air Command's Boeing B-52 Stratofortress nuclear bombers would be rolled off the runway and sent airborne at once so as to escape destruction from possible incoming nuclear detonations.

If NORAD radar continues to indicate incoming ballistic-missiles a "threat assessment conference" is quickly called. NORAD officers race to confirm or deny radar indications of an enemy submarine depressed-trajectory missile launch using redundant radar systems. Depending upon the expected arrival-time of the incoming ballistic missiles, officials at NORAD would presumably contact either the Commander in Chief of the Strategic Air Command at Offut AFB in Omaha, Nebraska, the President's National Security Advisor, or the US Secretary of Defense, and presumably provide a menu of available US ballistic-missile launch options.

Using a "depressed-trajectory" launch from a Russian "Yankee-Class" ballistic-missile submarine off the Atlantic Seaboard, the Father of the US nuclear Navy, Admiral Hyman G. Rickover, testified in US Senate Armed Service DOD Hearings that the Russians could put a nuclear-tipped ballistic-missile in the "Washington area" in "several minutes."

A Russian submarine depressed-trajectory launch is a ballistic missile launched on an extreme low angle so as to both delay early radar detection and shorten the flight-time to Washington DC. "DT" launches more resemble the low-angle flight-path of a cruise missile than ballistic-missiles which normally enter the stratosphere before making a descent.

Such an extreme compression of the warning time from 12 hours (Russian nuclear bombers) to 25 minutes (Russian land-based ballistic-missiles) to "several minutes" (Russian submarines off the US Atlantic Seaboard) leads straight to the question of predelegation of authority to use nuclear weapons. It is a touchy subject, for obvious reasons.

But open source literature indicates there are indeed adequate provisions for insuring the use of nuclear weapons in the event of incapacitation of the president or an attack on Washington. It is logical to assume a more thorough pre-delegation of authority to use nuclear weapons by high-ranking military officers at NORAD, Strategic Air Command HQ, Offut AFB, Nebraska, DOD (Pentagon), SAC Airborne Command Post etc. would, upon any severe uptick in world-wide political/military tensions, presumably begin.

To allow anything more than a very tightly controlled predelegation of authority to use nuclear weapons/launch ballistic-missiles in peacetime is vastly too dangerous. However, wthout the capacity to predelegate the use of nuclear weapons in intense political/military crises, the US would risk neutralization of most of the US nuclear ballistic-missile forces if just one man was attacked. No sane political/military command structure would take such a risk.

The responsibility of officials at NORAD during a false alert in an intense political/military crisis has to be thousands of times more sober and careful than what passes for normal. During an intense world-wide political military crisis, launching by mistake can kill just as many as launching on purpose. US SECDEF William S. Cohen estimated casualties (fatalities only) from a full US/USSR atomic exchange at 4.2B.

(19) Amid chocolate cake and music, the world waltzed off to war: Express, February 2, 2014