July 1914.com - References

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Summary quotes:
(1) Harold Denton, Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Nuclear Regulatory Commission appointed by President J. Carter to direct operations at the Three-Mile_Island Unit II Nuclear Reactor:

"He found the power plant to be in 'absolute chaos,' he told The Washington Post at the time. He brought in as many as 100 scientists to examine the facility, and a special phone line was installed, connecting Mr. Denton directly to the White House."

"At 3:55 a.m. on March 28, 1979, people living near the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant about a dozen miles from Harrisburg, Pa., were awakened by a loud roar that 'shook the windows, the whole house,' in the words of one resident.

"Within hours, alarm sirens sounded inside the facility, as workers struggled to understand what was happening. Harold Denton, the country’s leading authority on nuclear safety, was summoned from a meeting at Nuclear Regulatory Commission headquarters and told that a 'relatively serious sort of event' had occurred...

"Telephone lines were overburdened, making communications between Three Mile Island and Washington difficult. NRC Chairman Joseph Hendrie said he and Pennsylvania Gov. Richard Thornburgh were 'operating almost totally in the blind. His information is ambiguous, mine is nonexistent.'

"Mr. Denton was monitoring events from NRC’s headquarters, but President Jimmy Carter said a federal official should be at the scene to take charge. On March 30, two days after the initial accident, Mr. Denton flew to Three Mile Island in a White House helicopter.

"He found the power plant to be in 'absolute chaos,' he told The Washington Post at the time." [italics added]

Harold Denton, nuclear regulator who calmed fears at Three Mile Island, dies at 80: Washington Post https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/harold-denton-nuclear-regulator-who-calmed-fears-at-three-mile-island-dies-at-80/2017/02/21/e3ac577c-f527-11e6-8d72-263470bf0401_story.html?utm_term=.3b49a8ce73a2

See also:  Commissioners Deplored a Lack of Information, Meeting Records Show: New York Times, April 13, 1979: "WASHINGTON, April 12 — In long, secret meetings in the first days after the accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant, some members of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission expressed fear that the 'horse race' against a calamity might be lost. ...

"On Friday, March 30, the third day of the crisis, the commission chairman, Joseph M. Hendrie, said of the problems facing him and Gov. Dick Thornburgh of Pennsylvania: 'It seems to me I have got to call the Governor. We are operating almost totally in the blind; his information is ambiguous, mine is nonexistent and —I don't know — it's like a couple of blind men staggering around making decisions.'

"The drama and confusion of those days came to life today in more than 800 pages of transcripts from closed commission meetings that were given to three Congressional subcommittees.

"..the five commissioners and the agency's technical staff were, at times, near despair because of sketchy information about the reactor and the difficulty of evaluating unforeseen events. Repeatedly, they discussed the possible disasters involving a core meltdown or a gas explosion that might have spilled large, lethal doses of radioactivity into the countryside..

"Describing extensive damage to the reactor core to the commissioners on March 30, Roger J. Mattson, the director of the division of systems safety, said, 'We saw failure modes the likes of which have never been analyzed.""Do we win the horse race or do we lose the horse race?' he asked in discussing how to remove the [Hydrogen] bubble.

"...N.R.C. nearly recommended an evacuation out to five miles downwind after a plume of radioactive gas was vented Friday morning. 'The latest burst didn't hurt many people,' Mr. Mattson said in the Friday meeting. 'I'm not sure why we're not moving people. Got to say it, I have been saying it down here: I don't know what we are protecting at this point, I think we ought to be rnovin[sic] people.'

".. But Dr. Hendrie has since explained in Congressional testimony that the early calculations on the evolution of oxygen in the reactor, which suggested a flammable or explosive mixture, were in error. However, in the early days after the accident, the question caused great alarm.

"At one point, Mr. Denton expressed concern that plant officials were net[sic] providing clear information. 'It is really difficult to get that data,' he said. 'We seem to get it after the fact.'" [italics added] http://www.nytimes.com/1979/04/13/archives/commissioners-deplored-a-lack-of-information-meeting-records-show.html

  • See also:
Excerpts From Nuclear Mishap Talks: New York Times, April 14, 1979. "WASHINGTON, April 13 — The accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear station began on Wednesday, March 28. But for the first 48 hours the Federal agency responsible for assuring the safety of the reactors was reasonably confident that the public was not seriously endangered....

"But on Friday, March 30, engineers of the Metropolitan Edison Company released a plume of radioactive material into the atmosphere from the crippled plant. Partly because of this release of radioactivity and partly because some of the commission's top officials had reached the scene of the accident, the commission's view of the problem became far more pessimistic.

"Beginning shortly after 9 A.M. March 30, the five members of the commission began a long and extraordinary series of formal meetings in which they attempted to understand what was occurring within the seriously damaged reactor, what the possible consequences might be, what recommendations they should make to Pennsylvania Gov. Dick Thornburgh and how they should deal with the public, the press and the White House.

"The following are excerpts from the sometimes highly technical conversations of these and other officials as they struggled with the worst accident in the history of the commercial use of nuclear power...

[Friday, March 30] "MR. DENTON: Yes, I think the important thing for evacuation to get ahead of the plume is to get a start rather than sitting here waiting to die. Even if we can't minimize the individual dose, there might still be a chance to limit the population dose.

"MR. HENDRIE: It seems to me I have got to call the Governor.

"MR. FOUCHARD: I do. I think you have got to talk to him immediately...

"MR. THORNBURGH: Do we have any assurances that there is not going to be any more of these releases?...


"MR. MATTSON: It's too little information too late unfortunately, and it is the same way every partial core meltdown has gone. People haven't believed the instrumentation as they went along. It took us until midnight last night to convince anybody that those goddamn temperature measurements meant something. By 4 o'clock this morning, B.&W. [The Unit II Atomic Reactor designers, Babcock and Wilcox] agreed.

"MR. MATTSON: We are still doing analyses with what we now understand the conditions, to see if we can try to estimate with the codes, what the condition of the core really is. It is a failure mode that has never been studied. It is just unbelievable.

"MR. GILINSKY: What is your principal concern right at this minute?

i> "Mr. MATTSON: Well, my principal concern is that we have got an accident that we have never been designed to accommodate, and it's, in the best estimate, deteriorating slowly, and the most pessimistic estimate it is on the threshold of turning bad.

[ Saturday, March 31] "At the long commission meeting the next day, Saturday, March 31, the transcripts indicate, the members were still seriously concerned about the possible consequences of the accident, including a core meltdown."

"...And what happens then is you've now got a noncondensable gas evolution at substantial rate into the containment; the containment pressure goes up, you're going to come to a point eventually where you either vent the containment — you've got your choice, then, you can either vent the containment or you can let it go on up past the design pressure and probably somewhere on beyond a factor of two above design, why you'll blow something out...

"COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: I mean, is it at all likely that there is a sequence of events that could start anytime without warning which would leave you with substantially less than 200 minutes or six hours or whatever number on that order you want to use to have people more than five or 10 miles away.

MR. HENDRIE: I don't think it's a very large possibility but you can't rule it out.

"COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: What would the nature of the sequence be?

"MR. HENDRIE: A hydrogenn[sic] explosion in the vessel...

"MR. MATTSON: Let me say, as frankly as I know how, bringing this plant down is risky. There's a not negligible risk in bringing this plant down. No plant has ever been in this condition, no plant has ever been tested in this condition, no plant has ever been analyzed in this condition in the history of this program.

meltdown." "By Monday and Tuesday, the commission gradually began to feel that the operators of the crippled reactor. the hundreds of outside experts that had been assembled to consider various aspects of the accident and the N.R.C. staff had managed to bring the situation almost under control." [italics added]

  • See also:
Report of the President's Commission on the The Accident at Three Mile Island, October 1979, John Kemeny (President, Dartmouth College), Chairman.

"Over 100 alarms went off in the early stages of the accident with no way of suppressing the unimportant ones and identifying the important ones. The danger of having too many alarms was recognized by Burns and Roe during the design stage, but the problem was never resolved....Some key indicators relevant to the accident were on the back of the control panel.

"A shift supervisor testified that there had never been less than 52 alarms lit in the control room."

"Several instruments went off-scale during the course of the accident, depriving the operators of highly significant diagnostic information. These instruments were not designed to follow the course of an accident... The computer printer registering alarms was running more than 2-k hours behind the events and at one point jammed, thereby losing valuable information.

"Fourteen seconds into the accident, an operator in TMI-2's control room noted the emergency feed pumps were running. He did not notice two lights that told him a valve was closed on each of the two emergency feedwater lines and thus no water could reach the steam generators. One light was covered by a yellow maintenance tag. No one knows why the second light was missed.

Frederick and Faust (Unit II TMI Atomic Reactor control room operators] were in the control room when the first alarm sounded, followed by a cascade of alarms that numbered 100 within minutes. The operators reacted quickly as trained to counter the turbine trip and reactor scram. Later Faust would recall for the Commission his reaction to the incessant alarms: "I would have liked to have thrown away the alarm panel. It wasn't giving us any useful information."

"During the most critical phase of the accident, the NRC was working under extreme pressure in an atmosphere of uncertainty. The NRC staff was confronted with problems it had never analyzed before and for which it had no immediate solutions.

"... the control room crew. They later described the accident as a combination of events they had never experienced, either in operating the plant or in their training simulations.

"After an incident at TMI-2 a year earlier during which the PORV stuck open, an indicator light was installed in the control room. That light showed only that a signal had been sent to close the valve -- it did not show whether the valve was actually closed -- and this contributed to the confusion during the accident.

"The accident got sufficiently out of hand so that those attempting to control it were operating somewhat in the dark. While today the causes are well understood, 6 months after the accident it is still difficult to know the precise state of the core and what the conditions are inside the reactor building. Once an accident reaches this stage, one that goes beyond well-understood principles, and puts those controlling the accident into an experimental mode (this happened during the first day), the uncertainty of whether an accident could result in major releases of radioactivity is too high...

"In an interview with the Commission staff, Mattson [Roger Mattson, director of NRC's Division of Systems Safety described what happened next:

'And Stello tells me I am crazy, that he doesn't believe it, that he thinks we've made an error in the rate of calculation...Stello says we're nuts and poor Harold is there, he's got to meet with the President in 5 minutes and tell it like it is. And here he is. His two experts are not together. One comes armed to the teeth with all these national laboratories and Navy reactor people and high faluting PhDs around the country, saying this is what it is and this is his best summary. And his other [the operating reactors division] director, saying, "I don't believe it. I can't prove it yet, but I don't believe it. I think it's wrong."'

"Throughout the first week of the accident, there was extensive speculation on just how serious the accident might turn out to be...There was very extensive damage to the plant.

"Whether in this particular case we came close to a catastrophic accident or not, this accident was too serious. Accidents as serious as TMI should not be allowed to occur in the future...

"Although NRC personnel were on-site within hours of the declaration of a site emergency and were in constant contact with the utility, the NRC was not able to determine and to understand the true seriousness and nature of the accident for about 2 days, when the fact of extensive core damage and the existence of the hydrogen bubble were generally recognized within NRC.

"During the first 2-1/2 days of the accident, communications between the NRC Incident Response Center in Bethesda, Maryland, where the senior management was located, and the site were such that senior management officials found it extremely difficult to obtain up-to-date information.

Communications were so poor on Friday morning that the senior management could not and did not develop a clear understanding of conditions at the site...

"As long as proposed improvements are carried out in a 'business as usual' atmosphere, the fundamental changes necessitated by the accident at Three Mile Island cannot be realized.

"In addition to all the other problems with the NRC, we are extremely critical of the role the organization played in the response to the accident. There was a serious lack of communication among the commissioners, those who were attempting to make the decisions about the accident in Bethesda, the field offices, and those actually on site. This lack of communication contributed to the confusion of the accident. We are also skeptical whether the collegial mode of the five commissioners makes them a suitable body for the management of an emergency, and of the agency itself...We found serious managerial problems within the organization. These problems start at the very top." [italics added]

  • See also:
"Here we were, 4 days, plus a couple of hours after the accident...Just outside the front gates, Victor Stello and Roger Mattson were frantically reviewing the explosion theory. For 2 days, Stello had struggled to prove Mattson wrong. Finally, in the late afternoon, Victor Stello found the flaw in Mattson's calculations.

"They were using the wrong formula. The hydrogen bubble was never a threat. What puzzles me is how many people, not just at the NRC, not just at Three Mile Island, but people in the industry on the phone as tehnical consultants, technical consultants on site, how many of them dealt with that formula - and nobody noticed." [italics added]
The Incredible History Of Three Mile Island Documentary - 2017, 14 August 2017 45:10-46:09 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KXVDjhDct68

  • See also:
A top Sandia Labs analyst, Alan Swain, participated in a "WASH-1400" report of the TMI Unit II Atomic Reactor event, and his findings are also remakable. Swain used the term "incredulity response" to describe the reaction of control room operators to an extremely rare nuclear event. For example, among his findings, Swain estimated that in the first minute following a Loss of Coolant Accident, 9 out of 10 actions taken by control room operators would be wrong.

And see: "Three years later, a robotic camera was lowered into the core. It would be the first look at the full extent of the accident.

"Five feet of the core was gone. That's when we really saw that the core had been severely damaged.

"We had a meltdown at Three Mile Island. It was not the China Syndrome, but we melted the core down. 50% of the core was destroyed, or molten. And something on the order of 20 tons of uranium found it's way by flowing, in a molten state, to the bottom head of the pressure vessel. That's a core meltdown. No question about it." [Roger Mattson, Director, Division of Systems Safety, Nuclear Regulatory Commission] [italics added]

The Incredible History Of Three Mile Island Documentary - 2017, 14 August 2017 48:32-49:51. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KXVDjhDct68

(2) Estimates of WWI dead, injured or missing taken from "Source List and Detailed Death Tolls for the Primary Megadeaths of the Twentieth Century"


(3) John Schindler [Professor of National Security Affairs, U.S. Naval War College, formerly NSA]
May 5, 2014, New Thinking on the Origins of World War I, Foreign Policy Research Institute
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hMKqPgWJYr8 At 59:14.

(4) Famous Quotations on Monarchy: ALMANACH DE SAXE GOTHA. Official Website of the Almanach de Saxe Gotha Online Royal Genealogical Reference Handbook.

(5) Ibid.

(6) The Decline of Bismarck's European Order: Franco-Russian Relations 1875-1890: George F Kennan (U.S. Ambassador to Russia and Yugoslavia, and professor emeritus at the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton).

(7) Niall Ferguson: The Pity of War, 1999 at 143, 462.

(8)Sean McMeekin [author, July 1914: Countdown to War](in)
http://www.pieria.co.uk/ articles/interview_with_sean_mcmeekin

(9) Fritz Stern (quoted in) Still in the grip of the Great War: Economist, March 27, 2014.

(10) John Schindler [Professor of National Security Affairs, U.S. Naval War College, formerly NSA]
May 5, 2014, New Thinking on the Origins of World War I, Foreign Policy Research Institute
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hMKqPgWJYr8 [At 1:37:23]

(11) This also explains how, once WWI started and everybody could see that it was going to be a multiple year-long battle instead of the advertised "home by xmas," there was nobody in power in Europe/Britain who could put a stop to it. Almost all the principals, out of fear of any responsibility for igniting it, had crushed their roles in the affair and once it started were quite powerless to stop it.

(12) McMeekin, Sean: July 1914 Countdown to War: 2014, at 390.

(13) Christopher Clark, Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914, Gresham College October 2, 2014
(14)Sean McMeekin [Author, July 1914: Countdown to War] Interview
http://www.pieria.co.uk/ articles/interview_with_sean_mcmeekin

(15) Even in periods of relative world-wide peace such air-raid alerts at NORAD have caused short-lived but very serious problems. In the 1960's NORAD radar indicated a massive Soviet ballistic-missile attack. Senator Charles H. Percy (R. IL) happened to be touring the facility, along with Thomas J. Watson, CEO of IBM, and the head of Motorola. Percy testified all three men were ushered into a separate room, sweating for over 20 minutes. Percy testified in Department of Defense Armed Service Committee Hearings that NORAD officers "were absolutely convinced there were missiles coming at us."

The cause of the alert was that computer programmers forgot to include the orbit of the Moon, so when the Moon appeared on the horizon that night it showed up on the big display screens inside NORAD as a full-scale Soviet ballistic-missile attack. Needless to say, the problem of quickly resolving false alarms at NORAD goes into extremis in periods where there is not worldwide peace. Deep discussion of this problem in the open literature is virtually non-existant.

During any Soviet/Russian air-raid there would be only "several minutes" for officials at NORAD to radar detect the submarine-launched ballistic missile, which would be quickly discussed in a "missile display conference." The Strategic Air Command's nuclear bombers would be rolled off the runway and sent airborne at once so as to escape destruction from possible incoming nuclear detonations.

If NORAD radar continues to indicate incoming ballistic-missiles a "threat assessment conference" is quickly called. NORAD officers race to confirm or deny radar indications of a depressed-trajectory launch using redundant radar systems (SOSUS). Depending upon the expected arrival-time of the incoming ballistic missiles, officials at NORAD would presumably contact either the Commander in Chief of the Strategic Air Command at Offut AFB in Omaha, Nebraska, the President's National Security Advisor, or the US Secretary of Defense, and presumably provide a menu of available US ballistic-missile launch options.

Using a "depressed-trajectory" launch from a Russian "Yankee-Class" ballistic-missile submarine off the Atlantic Seaboard, the Father of the US nuclear Navy, Admiral Hyman G. Rickover, testified in US Senate Armed Service DOD Hearings that the Russians could put a nuclear-tipped ballistic-missile in the "Washington area" in "several minutes." A Russian depressed-trajectory launch in this case is a ballistic missile launched on an extreme low angle so as to both delay early radar detection and shorten the flight-time to Washington DC. "DT" launches more resemble the low-angle flight-path of a cruise missile than ballistic-missiles which normally enter the stratosphere before making a descent.

Such an extreme compression of the warning time from 12 hours (Russian nuclear bombers) to 25 minutes (Russian ballistic-missiles) to "several minutes" (Russian submarines off the US Atlantic Seaboard) leads straight to the question of predelagation of authority to use nuclear weapons. It is a touchy subject, for obvious reasons.

But open source literature indicates there are indeed adequate provisions for insuring the use of nuclear weapons in the event of incapacitation of the president or an attack on Washington. It is logical to assume a more thorough pre-delegation of authority to use nuclear weapons by high ranking military officers at NORAD, Offut AFB, DOD, US airborne command centers etc. would, upon any severe uptick in world-wide political/military tensions, commence promptly.

To allow anything more than a very tightly controlled predelegation of authority to use nuclear weapons/launch ballistic-missiles in peacetime is vastly too dangerous. However, wthout the capacity to predelegate the use of nuclear weapons the US would risk neutralization of the entire US nuclear forces if just one man was attacked. No sane political/military command structure would take such a risk.

The responsibility of officials at NORAD during a false alert in an intense political/military crisis has to be thousands of times more sober and careful than what passes for normal. During an intense world-wide political military crisis, launching by mistake can kill just as many as launching on purpose. US SECDEF William S. Cohen estimated casualties (dead only) from a full US/USSR atomic exchange at 4.2B.


(20) Prince Lichnowsky [German Ambassador the Great Britain]: My Mission to London 1912-14.
See also:

"When I returned to London in December, 1913, from a lengthy leave, the Liman von Sanders question had led to a fresh crisis in our relations with Russia. Sir E. Grey, not without concern, pointed out to me the excitement there was in Petrograd over it : 'I have never seen them so excited.'

"I received instructions from Berlin to request the Minister to exert a restraining influence in Petrograd, and to assist us in settling the dispute. Sir Edward gladly did this, and his intervention contributed in no small degree to smooth the matter over.

"My good relations with Sir Edward and his great influence in Petrograd were repeatedly made use of in similar manner when we wished to attain anything there, as our representative proved himself quite useless for such a purpose.

"During the fateful days of July, 1914, Sir Edward said to me : 'When you want to obtain anything in Petrograd you always apply to me, but if I appeal to you for your influence in Vienna you fail me.'"

"The good and confidential relations which I had succeeded in establishing, not only with society and the most influential people like Sir E. Grey and Mr. Asquith, but also with the great public at public dinners, produced a marked improvement in the relations of the two countries." (Ibid)

(21) Ibid.

(22) Once, in an important debate on Irish Home Rule in the House of Commons, someone shouted 'Where’s Grey?', to which the chorus of response was 'Gone fishing!' He had too." Great War Centenary: Sir Edward Grey - the possible spark for the Great War.

(23) Otto von Bismarck (1815-1898) Prime minister of Prussia (1862-73, 1873-90) and founder and first chancellor (1871-90) of the German Empire.

(24) Lloyd George [British Chancellor of the Exchecquer 1908-1915, Prime Minister 1916-1922]:War Memoirs, 1938, Vol I, Ch 3. https://archive.org/stream/warmemoirsvolume035284mbp/warmemoirsvolume035284mbp_djvu.txt

(24a) Past Foreign Secretaries: Sir Edward Grey, Viscount Grey of Fallodon

(25) Sir Edward Grey: Flyfishing 1899
https://archive. org/stream/cu31924003437849/cu31924003437849_djvu.txt

(26) George V: The Unexpected King and George VI: The Dutiful King – review: Richard Davenport-Hines, 20 December 2014

(27) Recreation: Viscount Grey of Falladon, K.G.: Address Delivered at the Harvard Union, 8 December 1919. https://ia902605.us.archive.org/12/items/recreationbyvisc17956gut/17956.txt

(28) Monaco Motors Blog. Tag Archives: Rolls Royce.

(29) The Great Horse Manure Crisis of 1894: Ben Johnson

(30) Sir Edward Grey: Fly-Fishing, 1899.
https://archive.org/ stream/cu31924003437849/cu31924003437849_djvu.txt

(31) | 1915 Mercedes 28/60 HP

(32) France, 1914 and the Artist Historians: Gary D. Doyle

(33) 1914 Mercedes 115HP

(34) Recreation: Viscount Grey of Falladon, K.G. Address Delivered at the Harvard Union, 8 December 1919.

(35) Colonel House's Report to President Wilson, Spring 1914.

(36) The Federalist Papers #6: Alexander Hamilton, 1787:

"The genius of republics (say they) is pacific; the spirit of commerce has a tendency to soften the manners of men, and to extinguish those inflammable humors which have so often kindled into wars. Commercial republics, like ours, will never be disposed to waste themselves in ruinous contentions with each other. They will be governed by mutual interest, and will cultivate a spirit of mutual amity and concord.

"Is it not (we may ask these projectors in politics) the true interest of all nations to cultivate the same benevolent and philosophic spirit? If this be their true interest, have they in fact pursued it? Has it not, on the contrary, invariably been found that momentary passions, and immediate interest, have a more active and imperious control over human conduct than general or remote considerations of policy, utility or justice? Have republics in practice been less addicted to war than monarchies?

"Are not the former administered by MEN as well as the latter? Are there not aversions, predilections, rivalships, and desires of unjust acquisitions, that affect nations as well as kings? Are not popular assemblies frequently subject to the impulses of rage, resentment, jealousy, avarice, and of other irregular and violent propensities? Is it not well known that their determinations are often governed by a few individuals in whom they place confidence, and are, of course, liable to be tinctured by the passions and views of those individuals?

"Has commerce hitherto done anything more than change the objects of war? Is not the love of wealth as domineering and enterprising a passion as that of power or glory? Have there not been as many wars founded upon commercial motives since that has become the prevailing system of nations, as were before occasioned by the cupidity of territory or dominion? Has not the spirit of commerce, in many instances, administered new incentives to the appetite, both for the one and for the other? Let experience, the least fallible guide of human opinions, be appealed to for an answer to these inquiries.[italics added]

"Sparta, Athens, Rome, and Carthage were all republics; two of them, Athens and Carthage, of the commercial kind. Yet were they as often engaged in wars, offensive and defensive, as the neighboring monarchies of the same times. Sparta was little better than a well regulated camp; and Rome was never sated of carnage and conquest.

"Carthage, though a commercial republic, was the aggressor in the very war that ended in her destruction. Hannibal had carried her arms into the heart of Italy and to the gates of Rome, before Scipio, in turn, gave him an overthrow in the territories of Carthage, and made a conquest of the commonwealth.

"Venice, in later times, figured more than once in wars of ambition, till, becoming an object to the other Italian states, Pope Julius II. found means to accomplish that formidable league, which gave a deadly blow to the power and pride of this haughty republic.

"The provinces of Holland, till they were overwhelmed in debts and taxes, took a leading and conspicuous part in the wars of Europe. They had furious contests with England for the dominion of the sea, and were among the most persevering and most implacable of the opponents of Louis XIV.

"In the government of Britain the representatives of the people compose one branch of the national legislature. Commerce has been for ages the predominant pursuit of that country. Few nations, nevertheless, have been more frequently engaged in war; and the wars in which that kingdom has been engaged have, in numerous instances, proceeded from the people.

"There have been, if I may so express it, almost as many popular as royal wars. The cries of the nation and the importunities of their representatives have, upon various occasions, dragged their monarchs into war, or continued them in it, contrary to their inclinations, and sometimes contrary to the real interests of the State. In that memorable struggle for superiority between the rival houses of AUSTRIA and BOURBON, which so long kept Europe in a flame, it is well known that the antipathies of the English against the French, seconding the ambition, or rather the avarice, of a favorite leader, protracted the war beyond the limits marked out by sound policy, and for a considerable time in opposition to the views of the court.

"The wars of these two last-mentioned nations have in a great measure grown out of commercial considerations,--the desire of supplanting and the fear of being supplanted, either in particular branches of traffic or in the general advantages of trade and navigation."

(37) King Edward VII, Prince of Pleasure - Part 2, Jun 1, 2011. Biographers Jane Ridley, Miranda Carter, et. al.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=74veChkRA&list=PLDmeihh_o7p_b_Mfi443IL430ezh_hOnr at 20:01. See also: Bertie: A Life of Edward VII: Jane Ridley, 2012, at 376-394.

(38) Marshal Boulanger and the Great Fashoda War: Edward Guimont.

(39) Fashoda Incident. ANGLO-FRENCH DISPUTE, EGYPTIAN SUDAN: The Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica

(40) The Fashoda Incident of 1898: Denis Judd, History Today: 3 March 1985

(41) Cited in Fashoda Incident:ANGLO-FRENCH DISPUTE, EGYPTIAN SUDAN: The Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica

(42) Cited in The Fashoda Incident of 1898: Denis Judd, History Today

(43) QUEEN VICTORIA: Lytton Strachey 1921

(44) Franz Joseph I, Emperor of Austria

(45) FOREIGN OFFICE.—(Class II.), HC Deb 10 July 1914 vol 64 cc1383-463

(46) The speed of telegrams between the various capitols on June 28th was unremarkable. By August 1 it had become a flood. The Outbreak of General War, August 1-4, 1914

See also: History of the Atlantic Cable & Undersea Communications, Porthcurno Cable Station & Skewjack Cable Station: Bill Glover

(47) Michael Neiberg: Outbreak of War in 1914: A New Look at an Old Problem, 28 Oct. 2016, at 1:43:25 to 1:44:31

(48) McMeekin, Sean: July 1914 Countdown to War, 2014, at 30-31.

(49) Ibid., at 35.

(50) John Schindler [Professor of National Security Affairs, U.S. Naval War College, formerly NSA]
May 5, 2014, New Thinking on the Origins of World War I, Foreign Policy Research Institute
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hMKqPgWJYr8 At 59:14.

(56) German Maxim MG08 (Maschinengewehr 08) Machine Gun.

(57) "Grey is usually depicted as a gentle, civilised figure who lamented the coming of war in 1914 with unaccustomed eloquence, and wrote find books on birdwatching and fly-fishing. A widower of fifty-two, his personal affairs were less arid than most of his contemporaries assumed. He conducted a lively love life, albeit much more discreetly than his colleague Lloyd George..." Max Hastings: Catastrophe 1914: Europe Goes to War

(58) Colonial Folly, European Suicide: Adam Hochschild: Why World War I Was Such a Blood Bath, 28 July 1914

(59) "Henry Ford and his engineers developed many of the crucial principles of modern mass production. The most notable of these was the continuously moving assembly line; its introduction in late 1913 reduced the assembly time of a Model T from 728 to 93 minutes. ['By 1920 the plant turned out a car every minute, and one out of every two automobiles in the world was a Model T.']"

(60) Henry Ford: My Life and Work

(61) Timeline of Transportation

(62) Sean McMeekin [Author, July 1914: Countdown to War]: Interview with Sean McMeekin, March 20, 2014
http://www.pieria.co.uk/articles/ interview_with_sean_mcmeekin

(63) ‘The most formidable document’

(64) Ibid.

(65) First World War: The German Army

(66) Krupp

(67) From brink of civil war, 14 My 2014 https://www.irishtimes.com/culture/heritage/from-brink-of-civil-war-1.1786613

(68) Ulster and the Home Rule Covenant

(69) Buckingham Palace Conference ends in failure: Initiative by King collapses after four days. 24 July 1914

(70) The Life and Letters of Walter H. Page, Volume I: Burton Jesse Hendrick, 1922.

(71) McMeekin, Sean: July 1914 Countdown to War, 2014, at 69.

(72) Assassination of the Austrian heir and wife: Guardian.Originally published in the Manchester Guardian on 29 June 1914

(73) Assassination at Sarajevo: BBC
http://www.bbc.co.uk/schools/gcsebitesize/history/mwh/ir1/assassinationrev1.shtml (74) [Daily Telegraph Archive] Daily Telegraph June 29 1914: The countdown to war begins as Archduke Franz Ferdinand is assassinated in Sarajevo

(75) Edward Grey. Sir Eyre Crowe, memo to Sir Edward Grey, 27 July 1914.

(76) The Daily Mail, 31 July, 1914.

(77) At Home: Daily Telegraph, 1 Aug. 1914, at 8.

(78) King and the Crisis. Daily Telegraph 1 Aug.1914, at 9.

(79) Sir George Buchanan: My Mission to Russia and Other Diplomatic Memories, 1923, at 189.

(80) http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/search/hotzendorf

(81) http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/search/servia?month=1914-7

(82) Austria and Servia 28 July 1914

(83) E. Grey. FOREIGN OFFICE.—(Class II.), HC Deb 10 July 1914

(84) River retreat of the man who took Britain to war: The Telegraph, Joe Shute, 02 Aug 2014.

(85) Lloyd George: War Memoirs Volume I, 1938.

89 (86) Frank Owen, Tempestuous Journey: Lloyd George and his Life and Times, 1954, at 261.

(87) http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/sittings/1914/jul/20#lords

(88) Austria-Hungary and Servia, 27 July 1914.
See also: http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/sittings/1914/jun/

(89) AUSTRIA AND SERVIA., HC Deb 27 July 1914. The SECRETARY of STATE for FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Sir E. Grey).


(96) Niall Ferguson: The Pity of War, 1999 at 154.

(97) 1903 Tour de France, July 1 to July 19, Results, startlist, photos and history.

(98) Timeline of Transportation

(99) Sir Edward Grey on the Cause of the War and the Peace Conditions: Sir Edward Grey (British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs through Edward Price Bell of the Chicago News), The New York Times, Current History, June 1916. http://www.jfredmacdonald.com/worldwarone1914-1918/britain-16siredward-grey-cause.html

(100) The Beijing to Paris Motor Race. Richard Cavendish describes the motor race to Paris which set off from Beijing 10 June 1907.

(101) The Incredible Automobile Race of 1907.

(102) Edwardian Transportation: The Car.

(103) "Motorcabs, informally known as “taxis” were introduced to London in 1907 after the General Motor-cab Company placed one hundred vehicles on the road. By the end of 1907 there were 723 taxis in London, a figure that quadrupled the in the next year. By 1910, there were 4,941 taxis..." Edwardian Transportation: The Car.

(104) Ibid.

(105) Ibid.

(106) Vauxhall 30/98.

(107) Vauxhall History.

(108) Ibid.

(109) 110 Years of Vauxhall.

(110) Mercedes 28/95 hp, 1914 - 1924

(111) The Big Four Eras in the History of British Motoring, 18 Nov. 2013: Monaco Motors Blog.

(112) 1914 Rolls Royce.

(113) "The Battle of the Somme left a deep mark on millions of families across the Commonwealth....It is often remembered for the huge losses on the first day (1 July 1916) but the Somme offensive continued over the following months - a total of 141 days - and men from every part of Britain and across the Empire took part. When it was halted in November, more than 1,000,000 Commonwealth, French and German soldiers had been wounded, captured, or killed."

"Some 150,000 Commonwealth servicemen lie buried in 250 military and 150 civilian cemeteries on the Somme. Six memorials to the missing commemorate by name more than 100,000 whose graves are not known." Commonwealth War Graves Commission.

(114) Posters and postcards of the Méditerranée and Riviera Express before 1914. Southwards in Search of the Sun

(115) National Railway Museum, Leeman Road, York, YO26 4XJ, UK: personal correspondence.

(116) "LMS Dining Car. This was a first class coach brought into service by the London North Western Railway. It took part in the Paris Exhibition in 1900 where it won the Grand Prix. The award winning coach was of such a high standard that King Edward VII took it straight into service on the royal train."

(117) "Great Air Race to Paris and Back.... No element of luck entered into Walter Brock's magnificent victory on Saturday... When Brock reached Hendon on Saturday afternoon and regained the Aerodrome, which he had left only that morning, he had earned for himself the proud distinction of being the first pilot to fly from London to Paris and back in a single day...His third successive victory, scored within the space of two months, in the three great aeroplane races of the year, stamps Walter Brock as one of the greatest cross-country pilots of the day." The Daily Telegraph, Monday, July 13, 1914, at 11.

(118) "By the outbreak of World War I in August 1914, 1,588 flights had carried 10,197 fare-paying passengers."

(119) http://www.airships.net/delag-passenger-zeppelins/
See also: "Zeppelins began with civilian use in 1909 and before World War I a total of 21 Zeppelin airships were made."
“The Zeppelin LZ 17- Sachsen was a German civilian passenger-carrying rigid airship first flown on 3 May 1913. It has transported 9,837 passengers in 419 flights, travelling 39,919 km. Later it was taken over by German military upon outbreak of World War I in 1914.”

(120) 1909 Blitzen-Benz

(121) Benz “Lightning Benz” 200 hp racing car.

(122) Margot Asquith: the stylish 'unbeauty' who won the Prime Minister's heart: The Telegraph, 29 October 2014

(123) A. Adonis: Reviewed: Edwardian Requiem - a Life of Sir Edward Grey by Michael Waterhouse, May 2, 2013

(124) "By fighting Germany in 1914, Asquith, Grey and their colleagues helped ensure that, when Germany finally did achieve predominance on the continent, Britain was no longer strong enough to provide a check to it." Niall Ferguson: The Pity of War, 1999 at 461.

(125) Ibid. at 160.
See also: "While Europe burned, responsibility for foreign affairs was transferred to the War Office. Grey, by and large, fished. His records show him on the [River] Itchen for much of the season in 2015, and 2016 when Lloyd George replaced Asquith’s cabinet." River retreat of the man who took Britain to war: The Telegraph, Joe Shute, 02 Aug 2014.

(126) A. Adonis: Reviewed: Edwardian Requiem - a Life of Sir Edward Grey by Michael Waterhouse, May 2, 2013

(127) King and the Crisis: Daily Telegraph 1 Aug.1914, at 9.

(128) Niall Ferguson: The Pity of War, 1999 at 163.

(129) The Guardian: In Europe 1914 every leading player had his hand on a smoking gun: Richard Norton-Taylor, July 31, 2014.

(130) "August 2 [1914]. Herbert Henry Asquith’s weekend has been ruined. The 62 year old prime minister had planned to go away with Miss Venetia Stanley (26), but the crisis is keeping him in London."

(130a) April 27, 2012: The priapic PM who wrote love letters to his mistress as he sent a generation off to die in the trenches.

(131) The Right Honorable Viscount Grey: The Conflict for Freedom, 1918.

(132) Colonel House meets with British foreign secretary in London

(133) Queen Victoria to Viscount Palmerston., THE TIMES AND PRUSSIA, Windsor Castle, 25th October 1861: The Letters of Queen Victoria, Volume III (of 3), 1854-1861, by Queen of Great Britain Victoria, Edited by Arthur Christopher Benson and Viscount Reginald Baliol Brett Esher

(134) Trading places: The UK, Germany and France, 21 January 2013: BBC

(135) QUEEN VICTORIA, By Lytton Strachey, 1921