July1914.com - References

[Under construction]

(1) Summary quote: Harold Denton, Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Nuclear Regulatory Commission appointed by President J. Carter to direct operations at the Three-Mile_Island Unit II Nuclear Reactor:

"He found the power plant to be in 'absolute chaos,' he told The Washington Post at the time. He brought in as many as 100 scientists to examine the facility, and a special phone line was installed, connecting Mr. Denton directly to the White House."

"At 3:55 a.m. on March 28, 1979, people living near the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant about a dozen miles from Harrisburg, Pa., were awakened by a loud roar that 'shook the windows, the whole house,' in the words of one resident.

"Within hours, alarm sirens sounded inside the facility, as workers struggled to understand what was happening. Harold Denton, the country’s leading authority on nuclear safety, was summoned from a meeting at Nuclear Regulatory Commission headquarters and told that a 'relatively serious sort of event' had occurred...

"Telephone lines were overburdened, making communications between Three Mile Island and Washington difficult. NRC Chairman Joseph Hendrie said he and Pennsylvania Gov. Richard Thornburgh were 'operating almost totally in the blind. His information is ambiguous, mine is nonexistent.'

"Mr. Denton was monitoring events from NRC’s headquarters, but President Jimmy Carter said a federal official should be at the scene to take charge. On March 30, two days after the initial accident, Mr. Denton flew to Three Mile Island in a White House helicopter.

"He found the power plant to be in 'absolute chaos,' he told The Washington Post at the time."

Harold Denton, nuclear regulator who calmed fears at Three Mile Island, dies at 80: Washington Post https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/harold-denton-nuclear-regulator-who-calmed-fears-at-three-mile-island-dies-at-80/2017/02/21/e3ac577c-f527-11e6-8d72-263470bf0401_story.html?utm_term=.3b49a8ce73a2

See also:  Commissioners Deplored a Lack of Information, Meeting Records Show: New York Times, April 13, 1979: "WASHINGTON, April 12 — In long, secret meetings in the first days after the accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant, some members of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission expressed fear that the 'horse race' against a calamity might be lost. ...

"On Friday, March 30, the third day of the crisis, the commission chairman, Joseph M. Hendrie, said of the problems facing him and Gov. Dick Thornburgh of Pennsylvania: 'It seems to me I have got to call the Governor. We are operating almost totally in the blind; his information is ambiguous, mine is nonexistent and —I don't know — it's like a couple of blind men staggering around making decisions.'

"The drama and confusion of those days came to life today in more than 800 pages of transcripts from closed commission meetings that were given to three Congressional subcommittees.

"..the five commissioners and the agency's technical staff were, at times, near despair because of sketchy information about the reactor and the difficulty of evaluating unforeseen events. Repeatedly, they discussed the possible disasters involving a core meltdown or a gas explosion that ght have spilled large, lethal doses of radioactivity into the countryside..

"Describing extensive damage to the reactor core to the commissioners on March 30, Roger J. Mattson, the director of the division of systems safety, said, 'We saw failure modes the likes of which have never been analyzed.''“Do we win the horse race or do we lose the horse race?' he asked in discussing how to remove the [Hydrogen] bubble.

"...N.R.C. nearly recommended an evacuation out to five miles downwind after a plume of radioactive gas was vented Friday morning. 'The latest burst didn't hurt many people,' Mr. Mattson said in the Friday meeting. 'I'm not sure why we're not moving people. Got to say it, I have been saying it down here: I don't know what we are protecting at this point, I think we ought to be rnovin[sic] people.'

".. But Dr. Hendrie has since explained in Congressional testimony that the early calculations on the evolution of oxygen in the reactor, which suggested a flammable or explosive mixture, were in error. However, in the early days after the accident, the question caused great alarm.

"At one point, Mr. Denton expressed concern that plant officials were net[sic] providing clear information. 'It is really difficult to get that data,' he said. 'We seem to get it after the fact.'" http://www.nytimes.com/1979/04/13/archives/commissioners-deplored-a-lack-of-information-meeting-records-show.html


And see: Excerpts From Nuclear Mishap Talks: New York Times, April 14, 1979. "WASHINGTON, April 13 — The accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear station began on Wednesday, March 28. But for the first 48 hours the Federal agency responsible for assuring the safety of the reactors was reasonably confident that the public was not seriously endangered....

"But on Friday, March 30, engineers of the Metropolitan Edison Company released a plume of radioactive material into the atmosphere from the crippled plant. Partly because of this release of radioactivity and partly because some of the commission's top officials had reached the scene of the accident, the commission's view of the problem became far more pessimistic.

"Beginning shortly after 9 A.M. March 30, the five members of the commission began a long and extraordinary series of formal meetings in which they attempted to understand what was occurring within the seriously damaged reactor, what the possible consequences might be, what recommendations they should make to Pennsylvania Gov. Dick Thornburgh and how they should deal with the public, the press and the White House.

"The following are excerpts from the sometimes highly technical conversations of these and other officials as they struggled with the worst accident in the history of the commercial use of nuclear power...

[Friday, March 30] "MR. DENTON: Yes, I think the important thing for evacuation to get ahead of the plume is to get a start rather than sitting here waiting to die. Even if we can't minimize the individual dose, there might still be a chance to limit the population dose.

"MR. HENDRIE: It seems to me I have got to call the Governor.

"MR. FOUCHARD: I do. I think you have got to talk to him immediately...

"MR. THORNBURGH: Do we have any assurances that there is not going to be any more of these releases?...


"MR. MATTSON: It's too little information too late unfortunately, and it is the same way every partial core meltdown has gone. People haven't believed the instrumentation as they went along. It took us until midnight last night to convince anybody that those goddamn temperature measurements meant something. By 4 o'clock this morning, B.&W. [The Unit II Atomic Reactor designers, Babcock and Wilcox] agreed.

"MR. MATTSON: We are still doing analyses with what we now understand the conditions, to see if we can try to estimate with the codes, what the condition of the core really is. It is a failure mode that has never been studied. It is just unbelievable.

"MR. GILINSKY: What is your principal concern right at this minute?

"Mr. MATTSON: Well, my principal concern is that we have got an accident that we have never been designed to accommodate, and it's, in the best estimate, deteriorating slowly, and the most pessimistic estimate it is on the threshold of turning bad.

[ Saturday, March 31] "At the long commission meeting the next day, Saturday, March 31, the transcripts indicate, the members were still seriously concerned about the possible consequences of the accident, including a core meltdown."

"...And what happens then is you've now got a noncondensable gas evolution at substantial rate into the containment; the containment pressure goes up, you're going to come to a point eventually where you either vent the containment — you've got your choice, then, you can either vent the containment or you can let it go on up past the design pressure and probably somewhere on beyond a factor of two above design, why you'll blow something out...

"COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: I mean, is it at all likely that there is a sequence of events that could start anytime without warning which would leave you with substantially less than 200 minutes or six hours or whatever number on that order you want to use to have people more than five or 10 miles away.

MR. HENDRIE: I don't think it's a very large possibility but you can't rule it out.

"COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: What would the nature of the sequence be?

"MR. HENDRIE: A hydrogenn[sic] explosion in the vessel...

"MR. MATTSON: Let me say, as frankly as I know how, bringing this plant down is risky. There's a not negligible risk in bringing this plant down. No plant has ever been in this condition, no plant has ever been tested in this condition, no plant has ever been analyzed in this condition in the history of this program.

"By Monday and Tuesday, the commission gradually began to feel that the operators of the crippled reactor. the hundreds of outside experts that had been assembled to consider various aspects of the accident and the N.R.C. staff had managed to bring the situation almost under control."


See Also Report of the President's Commission on the The Accident at Three Mile Island, October 1979 John Kemeny (President, Dartmouth College), Chairman.

"Over 100 alarms went off in the early stages of the accident with no way of suppressing the unimportant ones and identifying the important ones. The danger of having too many alarms was recognized by Burns and Roe during the design stage, but the problem was never resolved....Some key indicators relevant to the accident were on the back of the control panel.

"A shift supervisor testified that there had never been less than 52 alarms lit in the control room.

"Several instruments went off-scale during the course of the accident, depriving the operators of highly significant diagnostic information. These instruments were not designed to follow the course of an accident... The computer printer registering alarms was running more than 2-k hours behind the events and at one point jammed, thereby losing valuable information.

"Fourteen seconds into the accident, an operator in TMI-2's control room noted the emergency feed pumps were running. He did not notice two lights that told him a valve was closed on each of the two emergency feedwater lines and thus no water could reach the steam generators. One light was covered by a yellow maintenance tag. No one knows why the second light was missed.

Frederick and Faust (Unit II TMI Atomic Reactor control room operators] were in the control room when the first alarm sounded, followed by a cascade of alarms that numbered 100 within minutes. The operators reacted quickly as trained to counter the turbine trip and reactor scram. Later Faust would recall for the Commission his reaction to the incessant alarms: "I would have liked to have thrown away the alarm panel. It wasn't giving us any useful information."

"During the most critical phase of the accident, the NRC was working under extreme pressure in an atmosphere of uncertainty. The NRC staff was confronted with problems it had never analyzed before and for which it had no immediate solutions.

"... the control room crew. They later described the accident as a combination of events they had never experienced, either in operating the plant or in their training simulations.

"After an incident at TMI-2 a year earlier during which the PORV stuck open, an indicator light was installed in the control room. That light showed only that a signal had been sent to close the valve -- it did not show whether the valve was actually closed -- and this contributed to the confusion during the accident.

"The accident got sufficiently out of hand so that those attempting to control it were operating somewhat in the dark. While today the causes are well understood, 6 months after the accident it is still difficult to know the precise state of the core and what the conditions are inside the reactor building. Once an accident reaches this stage, one that goes beyond well-understood principles, and puts those controlling the accident into an experimental mode (this happened during the first day), the uncertainty of whether an accident could result in major releases of radioactivity is too high...

"In an interview with the Commission staff, Mattson [Roger Mattson, director of NRC's Division of Systems Safety described what happened next:

'And Stello tells me I am crazy, that he doesn't believe it, that he thinks we've made an error in the rate of calculation . . . . Stello says we're nuts and poor Harold is there, he's got to meet with the President in 5 minutes and tell it like it is. And here he is. His two experts are not together. One comes armed to the teeth with all these national laboratories and Navy reactor people and high faluting PhDs around the country, saying this is what it is and this is his best summary. And his other [the operating reactors division] director, saying, "I don't believe it. I can't prove it yet, but I don't believe it. I think it's wrong."'

" Throughout the first week of the accident, there was extensive speculation on just how serious the accident might turn out to be...There was very extensive damage to the plant.

"Whether in this particular case we came close to a catastrophic accident or not, this accident was too serious. Accidents as serious as TMI should not be allowed to occur in the future...

"Although NRC personnel were on-site within hours of the declaration of a site emergency and were in constant contact with the utility, the NRC was not able to determine and to understand the true seriousness and nature of the accident for about 2 days, when the fact of extensive core damage and the existence of the hydrogen bubble were generally recognized within NRC.

"During the first 2-1/2 days of the accident, communications between the NRC Incident Response Center in Bethesda, Maryland, where the senior management was located, and the site were such that senior management officials found it extremely difficult to obtain up-to-date information. Communications were so poor on Friday morning that the senior management could not and did not develop a clear understanding of conditions at the site...

"As long as proposed improvements are carried out in a 'business as usual' atmosphere, the fundamental changes necessitated by the accident at Three Mile Island cannot be realized.

"In addition to all the other problems with the NRC, we are extremely critical of the role the organization played in the response to the accident. There was a serious lack of communication among the commissioners, those who were attempting to make the decisions about the accident in Bethesda, the field offices, and those actually on site. This lack of communication contributed to the confusion of the accident. We are also skeptical whether the collegial mode of the five commissioners makes them a suitable body for the management of an emergency, and of the agency itself...We found serious managerial problems within the organization. These problems start at the very top."

And see: "Here we were, 4 days, plus a couple of hours after the accident...Just outside the front gates, Victor Stello and Roger Mattson were frantically reviewing the explosion theory. For 2 days, Stello had struggled to prove Mattson wrong. Finally, in the late afternoon, Victor Stello found the flaw in Mattson's calculations.

"They were using the wrong formula. The hydrogen bubble was never a threat. What puzzles me is how many people, not just at the NRC, not just at Three Mile Island, but people in the industry on the phone as tehnical consultants, technical consultants on site, how many of them dealt with that formula - and nobody noticed."
The Incredible History Of Three Mile Island Documentary - 2017, 14 August 2017 45:10-46:09 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KXVDjhDct68


Also, a top Sandia Labs analyst, Alan Swain, participated in a "WASH-1400" report of the TMI Unit II Atomic Reactor event, and his findings are also remakable. Swain used the term "incredulity response" to describe the reaction of control room operators to an extremely rare nuclear event. For example, among his findings, Swain estimated that in the first minute following a Loss of Coolant Accident, 9 out of 10 actions taken by control room operators would be wrong.

And see: "Three years later, a robotic camera was lowered into the core. It would be the first look at the full extent of the accident.

"Five feet of the core was gone. That's when we really saw that the core had been severely damaged.

"We had a meltdown at Three Mile Island. It was not the China Syndrome, but we melted the core down. 50% of the core was destroyed, or molten. And something on the order of 20 tons of uranium found it's way by flowing, in a molten state, to the bottom head of the pressure vessel. That's a core meltdown. No question about it." [Roger Mattson, Director, Division of Systems Safety, Nuclear Regulatory Commission]

The Incredible History Of Three Mile Island Documentary - 2017, 14 August 2017 48:32-49:51. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KXVDjhDct68

(2) Famous Quotations on Monarchy: ALMANACH DE SAXE GOTHA. Official Website of the Almanach de Saxe Gotha Online Royal Genealogical Reference Handbook.

(3) Ibid.

(4) Prince Lichnowsky [German Ambassador the Great Britain]: My Mission to London 1912-14.

(5) Once, in an important debate on Irish Home Rule in the House of Commons, someone shouted 'Where’s Grey?', to which the chorus of response was 'Gone fishing!' He had too." Great War Centenary: Sir Edward Grey - the possible spark for the Great War.

(6) Lloyd George [British Chancellor of the Exchecquer 1908-1915, Prime Minister 1916-1922]:War Memoirs, 1938, Vol I, Ch 3. https://archive. org/stream/warmemoirsvolume035284mbp/warmemoirsvolume035284mbp_djvu.txt

(6a) Sir Edward Grey: Flyfishing 1899
https://archive. org/stream/cu31924003437849/cu31924003437849_djvu.txt

(7) Recreation: Viscount Grey of Falladon, K.G.: Address Delivered at the Harvard Union, 8 December 1919. https://ia902605.us.archive.org/12/items/recreationbyvisc17956gut/17956.txt

(7a) George V: The Unexpected King and George VI: The Dutiful King – review: Richard Davenport-Hines, 20 December 2014
(8) Monaco Motors Blog. Tag Archives: Rolls Royce.

(9) The Great Horse Manure Crisis of 1894: Ben Johnson

(9a) Sir Edward Grey: Fly-Fishing, 1899.
https://archive.org/ stream/cu31924003437849/cu31924003437849_djvu.txt

(10) | 1915 Mercedes 28/60 HP

(11) France, 1914 and the Artist Historians: Gary D. Doyle

(12) 1914 Mercedes 115HP

(13) Recreation: Viscount Grey of Falladon, K.G. Address Delivered at the Harvard Union, 8 December 1919.

(14) Colonel House's Report to President Wilson, Spring 1914.

(15) Winston Churchill: Defence Through Deterrents, 1 March 1955, at 1895.

(16) Benjamin Disraeli

(17) King Edward VII, Prince of Pleasure - Part 2, Jun 1, 2011. Biographers Jane Ridley, Miranda Carter, et. al.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=74veChkRA&list=PLDmeihh_o7p_b_Mfi443IL430ezh_hOnr at 20:01. See also: Bertie: A Life of Edward VII: Jane Ridley, 2012, at 376-394.

(18) Marshal Boulanger and the Great Fashoda War: Edward Guimont.

(19) Fashoda Incident. ANGLO-FRENCH DISPUTE, EGYPTIAN SUDAN: The Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica

(20) The Fashoda Incident of 1898: Denis Judd, History Today: 3 March 1985

(21) Cited in Fashoda Incident:ANGLO-FRENCH DISPUTE, EGYPTIAN SUDAN: The Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica

(22) Cited in The Fashoda Incident of 1898: Denis Judd, History Today

(23) QUEEN VICTORIA: Lytton Strachey 1921

(24)[ reference to be added]

(25) Franz Joseph I, Emperor of Austria

(26) FOREIGN OFFICE.—(Class II.), HC Deb 10 July 1914 vol 64 cc1383-463

(27) History of the Atlantic Cable & Undersea Communications, Porthcurno Cable Station & Skewjack Cable Station: Bill Glover

(28) Michael Neiberg: Outbreak of War in 1914: A New Look at an Old Problem, 28 Oct. 2016, at 1:43:25 to 1:44:31

(29) McMeekin, Sean: July 1914 Countdown to War, 2014, at 30-31.

(30) Ibid., at 35.

(31) German Maxim MG08 (Maschinengewehr 08) Machine Gun.

(32) "Grey is usually depicted as a gentle, civilised figure who lamented the coming of war in 1914 with unaccustomed eloquence, and wrote find books on birdwatching and fly-fishing. A widower of fifty-two, his personal affairs were less arid than most of his contemporaries assumed. He conducted a lively love life, albeit much more discreetly than his colleague Lloyd George..." Max Hastings: Catastrophe 1914: Europe Goes to War

(33) "Henry Ford and his engineers developed many of the crucial principles of modern mass production. The most notable of these was the continuously moving assembly line; its introduction in late 1913 reduced the assembly time of a Model T from 728 to 93 minutes. ['By 1920 the plant turned out a car every minute, and one out of every two automobiles in the world was a Model T.']"

(34) Henry Ford: My Life and Work

(35) Timeline of Transportation

(36) ‘The most formidable document’

(37) Ibid.

(38) First World War: The German Army

(39) Krupp

(40) From brink of civil war, 14 My 2014 https://www.irishtimes.com/culture/heritage/from-brink-of-civil-war-1.1786613

(41) Ulster and the Home Rule Covenant

(42) Buckingham Palace Conference ends in failure: Initiative by King collapses after four days. 24 July 1914

(43) The Life and Letters of Walter H. Page, Volume I by Burton Jesse Hendrick, 1922.

(44) McMeekin, Sean: July 1914 Countdown to War, 2014, at 69.

(45) Edward Grey. Sir Eyre Crowe, memo to Sir Edward Grey, 27 July 1914.

(46) The Daily Mail, 31 July, 1914.

(47) At Home. Daily Telegraph, 1 Aug. 1914, at 8.

(48) King and the Crisis. Daily Telegraph 1 Aug.1914, at 9.

(49) Sir George Buchanan: My Mission to Russia and Other Diplomatic Memories, 1923, at 189.

(50) Austria and Servia 28 July 1914

(51) E. Grey. FOREIGN OFFICE.—(Class II.), HC Deb 10 July 1914

(51a) River retreat of the man who took Britain to war: The Telegraph, Joe Shute, 02 Aug 2014.

(51b) Lloyd George: War Memoirs Volume I, 1938.

(52) Austria-Hungary and Servia, 27 July 1914.
See also: http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/sittings/1914/jun/

(53) AUSTRIA AND SERVIA., HC Deb 27 July 1914. The SECRETARY of STATE for FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Sir E. Grey).

(54) 1903 Tour de France, July 1 to July 19, Results, startlist, photos and history.

(55) Timeline of Transportation

(55a) Sir Edward Grey on the Cause of the War and the Peace Conditions: Sir Edward Grey (British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs through Edward Price Bell of the Chicago News), The New York Times, Current History, June 1916. http://www.jfredmacdonald.com/worldwarone1914-1918/britain-16siredward-grey-cause.html

(56) The Beijing to Paris Motor Race. Richard Cavendish describes the motor race to Paris which set off from Beijing 10 June 1907.

(57) The Incredible Automobile Race of 1907.

(58) Edwardian Transportation: The Car.

(59) "Motorcabs, informally known as “taxis” were introduced to London in 1907 after the General Motor-cab Company placed one hundred vehicles on the road. By the end of 1907 there were 723 taxis in London, a figure that quadrupled the in the next year. By 1910, there were 4,941 taxis..." Edwardian Transportation: The Car.

(60) Ibid.

(61) Ibid.

(62) Vauxhall 30/98.

(63) Vauxhall History.

(64) Ibid.

(65) 110 Years of Vauxhall.

(66) Mercedes 28/95 hp, 1914 - 1924

(67) The Big Four Eras in the History of British Motoring, 18 Nov. 2013: Monaco Motors Blog.

(68) 1914 Rolls Royce.

(69) "The Battle of the Somme left a deep mark on millions of families across the Commonwealth....It is often remembered for the huge losses on the first day (1 July 1916) but the Somme offensive continued over the following months - a total of 141 days - and men from every part of Britain and across the Empire took part. When it was halted in November, more than 1,000,000 Commonwealth, French and German soldiers had been wounded, captured, or killed."

"Some 150,000 Commonwealth servicemen lie buried in 250 military and 150 civilian cemeteries on the Somme. Six memorials to the missing commemorate by name more than 100,000 whose graves are not known." Commonwealth War Graves Commission.

(70) Posters and postcards of the Méditerranée and Riviera Express before 1914. Southwards in Search of the Sun

(71) National Railway Museum, Leeman Road, York, YO26 4XJ, UK: personal correspondence.

(72) "LMS Dining Car. This was a first class coach brought into service by the London North Western Railway. It took part in the Paris Exhibition in 1900 where it won the Grand Prix. The award winning coach was of such a high standard that King Edward VII took it straight into service on the royal train."

(73) "Great Air Race to Paris and Back.... No element of luck entered into Walter Brock's magnificent victory on Saturday... When Brock reached Hendon on Saturday afternoon and regained the Aerodrome, which he had left only that morning, he had earned for himself the proud distinction of being the first pilot to fly from London to Paris and back in a single day...His third successive victory, scored within the space of two months, in the three great aeroplane races of the year, stamps Walter Brock as one of the greatest cross-country pilots of the day." The Daily Telegraph, Monday, July 13, 1914, at 11.

(74) "By the outbreak of World War I in August 1914, 1,588 flights had carried 10,197 fare-paying passengers."

(75) http://www.airships.net/delag-passenger-zeppelins/
See also: "Zeppelins began with civilian use in 1909 and before World War I a total of 21 Zeppelin airships were made."
“The Zeppelin LZ 17- Sachsen was a German civilian passenger-carrying rigid airship first flown on 3 May 1913. It has transported 9,837 passengers in 419 flights, travelling 39,919 km. Later it was taken over by German military upon outbreak of World War I in 1914.”

(76) 1909 Blitzen-Benz

(77) Benz “Lightning Benz” 200 hp racing car.

(78) Margot Asquith: the stylish 'unbeauty' who won the Prime Minister's heart: The Telegraph, 29 October 2014

(79) Reviewed: Edwardian Requiem - a Life of Sir Edward Grey by Michael Waterhouse, May 2, 2013

(80) "By fighting Germany in 1914, Asquith, Grey and their colleagues helped ensure that, when Germany finally did achieve predominance on the continent, Britain was no longer strong enough to provide a check to it." Niall Ferguson: The Pity of War, 1999 at 461.

(81) Ibid. at 160.
See also: "While Europe burned, responsibility for foreign affairs was transferred to the War Office. Grey, by and large, fished. His records show him on the [River] Itchen for much of the season in 2015, and 2016 when Lloyd George replaced Asquith’s cabinet." River retreat of the man who took Britain to war: The Telegraph, Joe Shute, 02 Aug 2014.

(82) King and the Crisis. Daily Telegraph 1 Aug.1914, at 9.

(83) "August 2 [1914]. Herbert Henry Asquith’s weekend has been ruined. The 62 year old prime minister had planned to go away with Miss Venetia Stanley (26), but the crisis is keeping him in London."

(84) The Right Honorable Viscount Grey: The Conflict for Freedom, 1918.

(85) Colonel House meets with British foreign secretary in London

(86) QUEEN VICTORIA, By Lytton Strachey, 1921